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LEGISLATIVE UPDATES
Civil Regulation of
Obscenity in Oregon
Introduction
House Bill 2666 was introduced into the 1991 ses-
sion of the Oregon Legislature on Feb. 15, 1991.1
This bill would allow a purchaser, or the parent or
guardian of a purchaser who is a minor, to return a
video or audio recording if the purchaser certifies
that: (1) in his or her opinion the recording is
obscene; and, (2) the recording has not been copied.
If the purchaser had an opportunity to preview the
recording before purchase, or if the recording car-
ried a warning label it is not returnable. 2 H.B. 2666
was first read on February 15, 1991 and assigned
to the House Committee on Business and Con-
sumer Affairs on February 21, 1991. 3 No further
action was taken in this legislative session. It is not
known if the bill will be introduced in the next
session.4
This update will discuss the proposed legislation,
H.B. 2666, in the context of Oregon's obscenity law.
It will also examine relevant case law and how H.B.
2666 could reintroduce obscenity into state stat-
utes.
Background
Since 1960 the Oregon Supreme Court had held
that the Oregon Constitution, art. I, § 85 was con-
gruent with the United States Constitution's First
Amendment where obscenity was concerned. In
Oregon v. Jackson,6 the Oregon Supreme Court
specifically upheld this presumption and rejected
an interpretation of the Oregon Constitution which
would protect obscenity. 7 Virtually the same deci-
sion resulted eight years later in Oregon v. Childs.8
The Oregon Supreme Court held that there was no
legal basis for construing article I, § 8, of the Oregon
Constitution more broadly than the First Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. 9 As the
U.S. Supreme Court obscenity standard evolved
from national to state standards, 10 the Oregon leg-
islature kept pace1" and the Oregon Supreme Court
continued to uphold the legislative mandate, 12 in-
cluding the 1973 obscenity statute, ORS 167.087,
at issue in Oregon v. Henry.'3
In 1982 the Oregon Supreme Court decided Oregon
v. Robertson. 4 In the Robertson decision the court
developed a test for deciding which types of speech,
if any, could be restricted in accordance with the
Oregon Constitution. 15 Under the Robertson test,
the Oregon Constitution's freedom of expression
guarantee forecloses the enactment of legislation
which prohibits free expression on any subject
whatsoever unless "the prohibition falls within an
original or modern version of an historically estab-
lished exception to free expression."16 Examples of
such historical exceptions include ,peijuiy, solicita-
tion or verbal assistance in crime, some forms of
theft, forgery and fraud and their contemporary
variants. ' 17
The Oregon Supreme Court used Oregon v. Henry
to apply the Robertson freedom of expression test
to "obscenity" under the Oregon Constitution.18 The
Oregon Court of Appeals overturned Earl Henry's
conviction for selling "obscene" material, but did so
on the basis of "vagueness" of the statutory defini-
tion of obscenity.1 9 The Oregon Supreme Court up-
held the appeals court, but on other grounds; spe-
cifically, it held that obscenity was protected speech
under the Oregon Constitution and used Henry as
a vehicle for striking down obscenity prosecutions
in the state. Using "adequate and independent
states grounds,' 20 and declaring in "a plain state-
ment" as required by the United States Supreme
Court,21 the Oregon Supreme Court struck down
ORS 167.087 as contradictory to art. I, § 8. It
pointed out that while the first amendment re-
strains "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press, 2 2 the Oregon Constitution precludes laws
"restraining free expression of opinion.2 3 The Ore-
gon Supreme Court read this language as covering
any expression of opinion, including verbal and
nonverbal expressions contained in "fims, pic-
tures, paintings, sculpture and the like.2 4 This
provision also covers "any subject whatever"2S and
does not contain any express exception for obscene
communications.26
In Henry, the Oregon Supreme Court undertook an
extensive examination of the legal history of ob-
scenity in England and the United States. It con-
cluded that the U. S. Constitution's "First amend-
ment was the product of a robust, not a prudish,
age,' 27 and thus the proscription of obscenity was
not well-established at the time the first amend-
ment was ratified.28 The court continued this his-
tory to 1859, specifically examining the laws of the
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territorial legislature prior to statehood.29 The ter-
ritorial statute which the court analyzed did not
define "obscene" and was directed primarily, in it's
view, to the protection of youth.30 Thus the court
was unable to find a well-established exception to
free speech which would allow the legislature to
proscribe obscenity. The court quoted with approval
from Judge Tanzer in Oregon v. Tidyman:
31
The difficulty [with the United States
Supreme Court's approach] arises from
the anomaly that the very purpose of the
first amendment is to protect expression
which fails to conform to community
standards.3
2
The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that charac-
terizing speech as obscene, no matter what test was
used, did not deprive it of protection under art. 1, §
8 of the Oregon Constitution.
In dicta, the Henry court went on to say that it "had
not held that this form of expression could not be
regulated in the interests of unwilling viewers,
captive audiences, minors and beleaguered neigh-
bors. '33 H.B. 2666 will be examined in light of these
exceptions.
Analysis of H.B. 2666
Unwilling viewers
In dicta, the Henry court explicitly provided that
the decision did not preclude the regulation of free
expression in the interests of "unwilling viewers,
captive audiences, minors [or] beleaguered neigh-
bors. 34 If a purchaser, aside from a parent or guard-
ian of a minor purchaser, buys a recording without
realizing that the contents might, in his or her
opinion, be "obscene," is that purchaser an "unwill-
ing viewer or a captive audience?" The Oregon
Supreme Court has not answered this question. It
did say in dicta in Henry that it had not foreclosed
the legislative ability to protect these groups.3 5 Yet,
the court has not provided any judicial support for
this statement. On the contrary, since the Henry
decision, the Oregon Supreme Court had two oppor-
tunities to protect "unwilling viewers, captive audi-
ences and beleaguered neighbors." In both deci-
sions the court struck down the regulations. In
Oregon v. Ray,36 it overturned the Oregon statute
criminalizing telephonic threats, and in City of
Portland v. Tidyman37 it overturned the Portland
ordinance restricting the locations of "adult" book-
stores.
While the Oregon Supreme Court consistently has
struck down statutes which criminalize utterances
and behavior which could be characterized as "ob-
scene," it has also given judicial support, at least in
dicta, to legislative attempts to deal with offensive
utterances and material by allowing the "unwilling
viewers and captive audiences" to remedy their
complaints in civil actions. In Ray the concurrence
stated:
There is no obvious reason why the state
cannot assist persons so injured to speci-
fied compensatory damages remedy
rather than leaving them to pursue a
tort remedy entirely on their own.3 8
Furthermore, .the court does not object to attempts
to curb this type of behavior and utterances, merely
to the criminalization of them. Justice Linde, con-
curring, stated that:
The almost invariable legislative im-
pulse when seeking to make harmful
behavior 'unlawful' is to turn to the
criminal law. I mean no more than to
suggest that when the state's object is to
help victims of abusive behavior, crimi-
nal law is not the only choice.39
This viewpoint is the approach taken in H.B. 2666.
A consumer who is unaware at the time of the
purchase of the contents of a recording may return
the recording within seven days, and, by certifying
that he or she considers the recording to be obscene
and that it has not been copied, receive a full refund
of the purchase price.4 0 The state becomes involved
only if the seller refuses to refund the money.41
If, as the dicta in Ray suggests, the Oregon Su-
preme Court will look with favor at self-help reme-
dies, a precedent exists at the federal level for this
type of remedy. The United States Supreme Court
in Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dept.42 found 39 U.S.C.
3008 to be constitutional.43 This statute allowed
anyone receiving by mail "a pandering advertise-
ment which offers for sale matter which the ad-
dressee in his sole discretion believes to be eroti-
cally arousing or sexually provocative," to ask that
the Postmaster General remove his or her name
from the mailing list of that sender, and that the
sender remove the recipient's name from all mail-
ing lists within the sender's actual or constructive
control."The Court upheld the statute because the
householder determined whether or not the mate-
rial was objectionable, no government decision on
the contents was required, or even allowed, and
householders should not have to be exposed in their
homes to material they find objectionable.45
H.B. 2666 allows the purchaser and not the govern-
ment to decide if the material is 'obscene,' and
therefore involves no direct government action. It
further provides for civil as opposed to criminal
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penalties, and even provides for a private right of
action. It is the purchaser who will regulate the sale
or distribution of free expression based on content,
not the state. An unresolved issue is whether or not
a householder deserves the same level of protection
in the home from a purchase as from unsolicited
mail.
Purchasers who are minors
H.B. 2666 provides for refunds to the parents or
guardians of purchasers who are minors if they
certify that in their opinion the recording is ob-
scene, that it has not been copied, and if it is
returned within seven days of purchase. 46 This pro-
vision could be found to be constitutional. The Su-
preme Court of Oregon found that the only obscen-
ity statute in the Oregon territorial code was a
statute which "included prohibitions against the
sale, distribution and possession of obscene writ-
ings or pictures which manifestly tended to corrupt
the morals of youths. '47 Under the Robertson test,
protection of minors from exposure to obscenity is
a "well-established exception to freedom of expres-
sion ' 48 embodied in the Oregon Constitution. Henry
further suggests the possibility of regulating ob-
scenity when minors are involved; independent of
this well established historical exception. 49 The
dicta in Oregon v. Ray50 might allow the type of civil
regulation proposed here, even if the court did not
find the "well-established historical exception."
Likewise, the arguments for a Rowan type of con-
trol are stronger for parents regulating what their
child brings into the house than they are for pro-
tecting adults from their own purchases. Rowan
allows a parent or guardian to remove a minor's
name from an objectionable mailing list.-" Simi-
larly, H.B. 2666 provides for parental supervision
of a minor's purchases brought into the home and
does not involve any governmental intervention in
the parental decision. The bill also provides for civil
rather than criminal penalties.
However, the Oregon Supreme Court allows
greater latitude to personal freedom of expression
than does the United States Supreme Court, even
when minors are involved. For example, the Su-
preme Court has approved "variable obscenity" in
Ginsberg v. New York.52 While the Oregon Supreme
Court has not yet decided this specific issue, the
Oregon courts of appeals have struck down sections
of the Oregon statutes criminalizing the distribu-
tion of obscene material to minors prior to the
Oregon Supreme Court decision in Henry.53 The
Oregon Supreme Court refused review in Woodcock
and review was not sought in Frick, even though
the statutory language of Frick was nearly identical
to the language in the statute upheld by the United
States Supreme Court in Ginsberg.5 4 Both of the
Oregon cases involved statutes which criminalized
the activity.
The hostility of the Oregon Supreme Court to any
legislation criminalizing obscenity makes civil
regulation preferable through private rights of ac-
tion. H.B. 2666 provides for this and the Oregon
Supreme Court in dicta has given support to this
type of legislation.55
Labeling
Section 2 of H.B. 2666 provides that the retailer
does not have to refund the purchase price if:
(a) The recording is labeled or otherwise identi-
fied by the manufacturer, distributor or retail
seller as potentially obscene or offensive; or
(b) The purchaser is given the opportunity by
the retail seller to preview the recording by lis-
tening to all or a portion of the recording or by
reading a transcription of the words contained
within the recording.56
This provision allows the retailer to place a warning
label on every audio and video cassette, record, and
compact disk in the store, and thus short circuit the
bill; especially as it is applied to minors who often
buy a recording just because it has a label. If the
purpose of the bill is to allow parents to control their
children's purchases, then a better approach may
be to apply the labelling provision only to adults.
Parents or guardians could then return items
which, in their opinion, are obscene.
Conclusion
H.B. 2666, if it becomes law, would probably with-
stand a constitutional challenge under the Oregon
Constitution; especially the provisions for minor
purchasers. The bill is an improvement over the
labeling bills currently being introduced in legisla-
tures across the country. It puts the burden of
restricting a minor's access to potentially objection-
able material where it belongs; on the parent, and
not on the retailer. A parent who is concerned with
his or her child's music can preview what the child
is buying. Since H.B. 2666 provides for a private
right of action rather than criminal sanctions, a
retailer would not risk a criminal prosecution for
selling a recording which the parent, or a jury, later
finds to be obscene. In this author's opinion, the bill
would provide more protection for children without
restricting the free expression of adults. Q
Kristin K. Woods
1. H.B. 2666, 66th Leg., 1991 Oregon.
2. Id.
3. Search of LEXIS States library, Ortrck file (Oct. 7, 1991).
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